The functioning of labour markets from a demand-side perspective is examined. In particular, the determinants of vacancy duration are studied in the context of a model of employers' search behaviour. A model for the choice of the recruitment strategy at the start of the search process and the corresponding recruitment duration is developed in which allowance is made for di erent patterns of duration dependence for each recruitment strategy. This model is applied to data on employers' search behaviour in the Dutch labour market. It is found that employers prefer advertisements as the ® rst recruitment channel when applicants are required to have work experience. Moreover, employers prefer to start searching via the labour exchange o ce when jobs in the secondary segment of the labour market have to be ® lled. It is also found that Ð when advertisements are used as the ® rst recruitment strategy Ð employers need some time to acquire a pool of applicants and to select candidates from this pool. It is interesting as a contrast that applicants seem to be evaluated rather quickly if employers start searching via informal contacts.
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I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Since the beginning of the 1980s unemployment has shown dramatic growth in the Netherlands. Even though there has been a remarkable rise in the number of jobs (starting in the mid-1980s), the reduction of unemployment is still modest. Paradoxically, employers' associations complain about vacancies that are hard to ® ll. Apparently, there is an increasing mismatch of demand and supply in the Dutch labour market.
At the micro level, imbalances in the labour market have, in a large number of studies, often been analysed on the basis of supply side indicators, such as the duration of unemployment (see, e.g. the pioneering studies of Lancaster, 1979; Nickell, 1979) . These studies are usually based on the theory of job search (for an overview see Mortensen, 1986) . Much less attention has been paid to demand side indicators of the functioning of the labour market, such as vacancy duration (see for example, Beaumont, 1978; Roper, 1988; Renes, 1989; van Ours, 1989 and 1990; and Gorter, 1991) . This is not surprising since data on vacancies in most countries are rather poor or absent.
The aim is to study employers' recruitment behaviour and vacancy duration by using micro data on ® lled vacancies in the Dutch labour market. A careful identi® cation of the determinants of the duration of a vacancy may provide a better insight into the potential of employers in the labour market to ® ll di erent kinds of jobs. Jobs with a short duration of vacancy tend to occur when there is a surplus of workers suitable to ® ll these jobs, while vacancies which are hard to ® ll suggest that there is a shortage of workers for them. One should realize, however, that di erences in vacancy duration may also re¯ect di erences in the duration of recruitment procedures for di erent jobs. It has been argued by van Ours and Ridder (1992) that`vacancy durations in the Dutch labour market are mainly selection periods and not search periods for applicants' , because they found that`almost all applicants arrive shortly after the vacancy has been announced' . Hence, they concluded that`employer search is mostly non-sequential' , which means that`employers advertise a vacancy and thereby 1 The literature focusing on the supply-side of the labour market (see for example, Osberg, 1993 for Canada), which emphasizes the large number of jobs obtained by personal contacts and direct approaches to the ® rm, suggests that some jobs are ® lled sequentially. 
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form a pool of applicants' . This conclusion is con® rmed by the follow-up study of van Ours and Ridder (1993) in which they explicitly distinguish between the application and the selection period. However, when van Ours and Ridder (1993) disaggregate by education they ® nd evidence that low skilled jobs are ® lled sequentially.
In this paper, we shall examine how vacancies are ® lled when employers use di erent recruitment strategies. For example, employers may decide to use informal contacts inside or outside the ® rm before placing an advertisement. This search strategy might lead to a short duration period for some vacancies.
1 An attempt will be made to shed light on this issue by studying the determinants of vacancy duration for each recruitment strategy separately. Moreover, we shall investigate which factors determine the decision to activate a recruitment channel.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present some information on the Dutch labour market and a brief overview of recruitment practices in the Netherlands. Then, in Section III, we shall present the model of employers' search which will be used to analyse our duration data for the Netherlands. After having discussed the explanatory variables of the model in Section IV, we shall present the estimation results in Section V. Finally, Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
The Dutch labour market has been characterized by substantial quantitative and qualitative discrepancies during the 1980s. First of all, unemployment has shown a dramatic growth at the beginning of this period (in absolute numbers, from 325 000 in 1980 to 820 000 in 1984). Since the mid 1980s, the situation, re¯ected by a growth of employment from - 2% in 1982/83 to 4% in 1985/86 has remarkably improved. In contrast to this upswing in labour demand, the reduction of unemployment has been modest in the second part of this decade. This is Ð among other reasons Ð due to the rise in labour force participation (the participation rate of women, in particular, increased signi® cantly: from 35% in 1980 to 45% in 1990). Also, there appeared to be a signi® cant lack of speci® c job opportunities for certain socioeconomic groups in the Dutch labour market.
Another indication of the increase in labour demand is the growth of job vacancies. Aggregate data on vacancies can be obtained from the vacancy surveys of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In these vacancy surveys some 20 000 ® rms were asked whether they had vacancies at the date of the survey. The CBS vacancy surveys are conducted on an annual basis.
Unemployed workers in the Netherlands have to register at the public employment o ce to be entitled to unemployment bene® ts. Aggregate data on unemployment are available (monthly) from this registration. When we combine the macrodata on unemployment and vacancy data (see Fig. 1 ), we observe the development of the unemployment and vacancy rates over time. As mentioned before, the unemployment rate in the Netherlands has risen substantially during the 1980s. In 1980 it was about 7%, in 1984 it was about 18%. Since 1984 unemployment decreased somewhat. The vacancy rate decreased from 1.2% in 1980 to 0.5% in 1983, but increased again in later years.
An important institutional feature of the functioning of the Dutch labour market is (as in many Western European countries) that layo costs are very high due to stringent regulations that protect workers against`unreasonable layo s'. In the Netherlands, the law demands that an employer must have acceptable reasons to lay o workers (for more details see Hassink, 1996) . It is well-known that high layo costs lead to a slow downward adjustment of employment (see, for example, Hamermesh, 1993) . Recently, empirical evidence has been found for the Netherlands that layo costs are substantially higher than hiring costs (see Hassink, 1996) . Hassink also argues, however, that downward adjustment of employment at the ® rm's level may be faster than upward adjustment when the ® rm encounters a su cient number of voluntary quits (these are assumed to be costless for the ® rm in his analysis). This implies that voluntary quits may be an important instrument for ® rms that wish to 2 Note also that many ® rms in the Netherlands went bankrupt at the beginning of the 1980s, which led to an enormous rise in unemployment and decrease in employment (as discussed above).
reduce their work force. In addition, Dutch employers have Ð to a large extent Ð also resorted to encouraging workers to enter the state of disability and receive high bene® ts (even when they were not disabled in a strict sense), as an alternative to laying o workers (as can be seen from the substantially higher proportion of disabled persons in the Netherlands in comparison with other European countries; see, e.g. Aarts et al., 1993) .
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Microdata on job vacancies in the Netherlands are available in the Dutch CBS survey, since here some questions are asked about the characteristics of the vacancies when ® rms report them. However, this information is limited in nature (see, for example, van Ours and Ridder, 1991) . Nevertheless, the CBS survey provides interesting data on the use of the labour exchange o ce, showing that its use has substantially declined over time (see also van Ours, 1994) . The share of vacancies noti® ed at the labour exchange o ce decreased from 63% in 1980 to 43% in 1986 (and even 33% in 1987) . Apparently, the recovery of the Dutch economy in the second part of the 1980s did not coincide with a greater use of the labour exchange o ce. In this respect, it should be emphasized that Ð as in many other countries Ð employers are not obliged to register their vacancies at the Dutch labour exchange o ce. It is also noteworthy that the Dutch labour exchange o ce will send applicants to the employer (when requested) without charge. Nevertheless, we observe Ð as mentioned above Ð a considerable decline in the (relative) use of the labour exchange o ce. The main reasons for the reluctance of employers to make use of the services of the Dutch labour exchange o ce are twofold, according to van Ours (1994) :`employers complain because applicants are sent too slow and do not ® t the requirements of the employer in either ability or motivation ' . Interestingly, van Ours (1994) shows Ð by means of matching analysis Ð that the labour exchange o ce`can improve the matching of unemployed and vacancies by applying intensive mediation methods'. An additional reason for the low market share of the labour exchange o ce is the existence of a negative stigma attached to applicants originating from a labour exchange o ce (note that this is also observed in other countries, see, e.g. for the UK labour market, Adnett, 1987) . Barron and Mellow (1982) have explained this stigma e ect by the fact that the labour exchange o ce will send applicants who are less likely to accept a job o er. As a result, ® rms are confronted with higher screening cost per vacancy when using the labour exchange o ce. Nonetheless, when it is used the labour exchange o ce appears to be quite e ective in matching unemployed workers and vacancies in the Netherlands (see Lindeboom et al., 1993; .
A di erent, very rich, data source on vacancies and recruitment practices in the Netherlands stems from a survey by the ILBO Institute carried out on request of the Dutch Ministry of Social A airs and Employment (the survey was called`How do Firms Recruit?'). This survey provides useful information on the (sequential) activation of various recruitment methods, the length of recruitment duration and also on the success of di erent recruitment channels (see also Section IV when we describe this dataset in full detail). Table 1 summarizes the main features of the recruitment practices of Dutch ® rms in 1986.
It can be observed that employers usually start searching for applicants via advertisements (as can be seen from thè market' share of 33%) or by using informal contacts (33%). The labour exchange o ce is much less often activated as a ® rst channel (13%). Advertisements appear to be extremely e ective since in almost all cases (92%) the opening of this channel ® rst leads to the hiring of an applicant via this channel (i.e., it becomes the hiring channel). When an employer uses informal contacts ® rst, it turns out to be the hiring channel in about half of all cases (56%), whereas the labour exchange o ce has a success rate of 63% (when opened as a ® rst channel). It is also striking to observe the di erences across channels regarding the proportion using more than one channel in the entire recruitment procedure. In the case of advertisements this ® gure is 28%, whereas it is 59% when informal contacts are ® rst activated. Finally, we notice that the mean vacancy duration is Ð on average Ð higher for advertisements (about six weeks) and lower when informal contacts are ® rst used (approximately four weeks). The latter observation supports the ® ndings of Roper (1988) 3 Note that Dutch employers are not forced to search for applicants in this non-sequential way institutionally, but deliberately choose to do so for e ciency reasons. 4 Employers may decide to screen a reduced number of applicants if the number in the pool is very large. On the other hand, applicants may also be considered on a case-by-case basis at the moment of arrival (i.e., the size of the pool is equal to one in a sequence). 5 The full recruitment process corresponds to a non-trivial search model with a complicated timing for optimal decisions (such as the sequence of search channels to activate, the sizes of corresponding pools of applicants and the optimal dates of transition from one channel to another). This dynamic programming problem is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 6 This model of employers' search can be generalized by allowing the employer to choose more than one recruitment channel at the beginning of the recruitment process. It is also noteworthy that if we make the additional assumption that di erent search channels (or search channel mix) reach di erent non-overlapping segments of the population, then we have a case similar to the Pandora's box in Weitzman (1979) . 7 If the cumulative distribution of e c is the type I extreme value (normal), we arrive at the multinominal logit (probit) model with M states for the probability of choosing a certain search channel (see, for example, Maddala, 1983 ).
for the UK, which show also that the informal method is the fastest in vacancy ® lling and newspaper advertisements the slowest recruitment strategy.
Finally, it should be re-emphasized (see also Section I) that previous empirical research on employers' search strategies in the Netherlands has shown evidence that almost all applicants arrive during the ® rst two weeks after the announcement of the vacancy (see van Ours and Ridder, 1992) . Apparently, it is bene® cial for the employer ® rst to form a pool (mainly as a result of placing an advertisement or notifying the labour exchange o ce) and to select the best candidate from this pool in the second stage of the recruitment process.
I I I . A MO D E L O F E M PL O Y E R S ' S E A R C H
In this section, we shall develop an operational model of employers' search behaviour which allows for sequential use of recruitment channels, since our data reveal that recruitment channels are not opened simultaneously (see Section IV). Consequently, employers are assumed to start searching for applicants by activating a recruitment channel (for example, placing an advertisement). We assume that the employer will choose the channel with the highest di erence between expected bene® ts and costs of using that channel. In the following phase of the recruitment process, employers delay the screening process and selection procedures until a pool of applicants is acquired via that channel. Next, the`best' applicant in the pool is selected on the basis of a set of suitable quali® cations. 4 Finally, the employer decides whether the selected applicant (from the pool) is acceptable by comparing the expected productivity of the applicant with the minimum required productivity level (i.e., the reservation productivity). If this selected applicant is not acceptable, the employer continues his recruitment by (i) activating an additional recruitment channel, (ii) re-activating the`old' channel (for example, placing a second advertisement), and/or (iii) waiting for the arrival of new applicants via the`old' channel.
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This model of employers' recruitment behaviour will be formulated by means of separate equations for the choice of the Þ rst recruitment channel and the corresponding recruitment duration.
As regards the choice of the Þ rst recruitment channel, our analysis proceeds as follows. Suppose the employer knows' the di erences in bene® ts (based on the productivity distribution among potential applicants and the reservation productivity) and costs (formed by direct search costs, selection and screening costs, and costs of`foregone' productivity) between the various channels. Consequently, the employer is able to evaluate the di erence (U) between the expected bene® ts (EB) and expected costs (EC) associated with the use of a certain search channel c ® rst as follows:
We assume that the employer chooses the ® rst search channel with the highest positive value U from a set of M channels. 6 Furthermore, the reduced form of the`utilityvariable' U c is simply written as
with z = vector of vacancy characteristics, and e c = an error term with density function p(e c ).
Equation 2 will be estimated by means of a discrete choice model.
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The second part of our employer's search model consists of a search duration equation, which will be formulated within the framework of the so-called hazard function approach (see Kiefer, 1988) . Let S c a (t) be the arrival rate of applicants selected via channel c. Pr c s is de® ned as the probability that the applicant selected via channel c is acceptable, i.e., the expected productivity of the applicant selected via channel c is higher than the reservation productivity. Then, the probability that a vacant job is ® lled (via channel c) during an in® nitesimal short period (t, t + dt) Ð given that it has been open until t Ð is the product of the arrival rate of selected applicants and the probability that an applicant is acceptable:
8 A problem that may occur in this model is that the choice of recruitment channel is also determined by variables not included in the reduced form model (for example, the unknown wage level). This unknown variable (or error term) may also a ect observed recruitment duration. In this case, we would end up with a simultaneous equation model in which the error term plays a role in both equations. However, when this error term is not signi® cantly present in the duration equation, we may estimate the recursive model as speci® ed in Equations 7 and 8. 9 In Appendix A, the data source is discussed in more detail.
where d c (t) is the intensity at which vacancies are ® lled via channel c (i.e., the hazard rate). Now, it is assumed that
Using Equations 3 and 4, we get
In our empirical application (see Section V), it appears to be impossible to identify the di erent components of the probability that vacancies are ® lled, because our data do not contain information on the arrival, screening and selection process. We can only estimate the`reduced form' of (5) :
Although this unrestricted reduced form model makes no distinction between di erent stages in the recruitment process, the underlying structure may be helpful for the interpretation of the estimated e ects. In particular, the e ect of duration dependence may originate from a time-varying reservation productivity or changes over time in the arrival rate of selected applicants per unit of time.
In sum, we arrive at the following recursive model of employers' search:
where c is the recruitment channel with the highest value U c (see also Equation 2).
To estimate this model, we have to specify the hazard function d c and the`value variable' U c . According to the proportional hazard model (introduced by Cox, 1972) d c is speci® ed as:
with t c (t) = a function of elapsed duration t, and b c = a vector of parameters.
For estimating this kind of model, we have to choose a functional form for the baseline hazard (t c (t)).
Next, we specify U c as
and if the cumulative distribution of e c is the type I extreme value we have
The model developed in Section III will be applied to data on job vacancies in the Netherlands. Micro data on vacancies, providing information on search methods and required skills of the applicant, are scarce in the Netherlands. We shall use in our analysis data from a survey of employers' recruitment behaviour (`How do Firms Recruit?') conducted in April/May 1986. This dataset consists of a sample of 723 ® lled vacancies. 9 In the sample, employers were questioned about the last vacancy ® lled in the past six months. In particular, questions were asked about the characteristics of the vacant job and the ® rm (including the requirements set for the applicant), their recruitment methods, and the time between the announcement of a vacant job and the acceptance of an applicant for that job (note that this is not necessarily equal to the total duration of the vacancy: recruitment may start before the job is actually vacant, and it may take time before an applicant who has been accepted actually starts working). The time period between announcement and acceptance ( T ) will be used as a proxy to measure vacancy duration in our model.
As regards the choice of recruitment channels, the dataset provides information on which channels have been used during the recruitment process. The following search categories may in principle be distinguished. First, employers may search for suitable applicants by using formal channels (advertising and labour exchange o ce). Second, informal channels may be used to ® ll a vacancy (recruitment within the ® rm and the use of informal contacts via friends and relatives outside the ® rm) and third, other channels (for example, consulting private employment o ces) may be used. In addition, we know the sequencing of search channels (but not Ð in all cases Ð the exact moment of opening) and also the channel via which the vacancy has been ® lled (from now on referred to as the hiring channel). In our model, the choice of the ® rst channel (c) will be used as a dependent variable. In addition, we shall examine the duration via the ® rst chosen channel.
The exogenous variables (z) included in the data can be classi® ed into two groups: variables related to the vacant job and variables related to the ® rm. The characteristics of the vacant job can be represented in terms of the applicant's required skills (educational level, speci® c educational skills, and work experience), the presence of age restrictions for the applicant, and the kind of contract o ered to the applicant (permanent versus temporary, and full-time versus parttime). The characteristics of the ® rm are related to the sector 1 0 The determinants of the timing of opening an additional channel are investigated in Gorter and van Ommeren (1996) by using multivariate duration techniques. 1 1 Annual vacancy surveys among employers carried out by the Dutch Central Statistical O ce show a constant level of the stock of vacancies in the relevant year 1986 (see also Fig. 1) . Moreover, the decomposition of the stock into vacancy in¯ow and duration appears to be almost equal at the beginning and the end of the relevant period (see Van Ours and Ridder, 1991) . This information supports the steady state assumption. 1 2 This is an exogenously strati® ed random sample with strata being identical to ® rms: at most one vacancy per ® rm is sampled. Furthermore, we note that Ð given the assumption of a steady state Ð there is no length bias present in the data: long spells and short spells are equally likely in the sample. 1 3 The approach of right-censoring at the moment of activation of a second channel has been adopted since the nature of the recruitment process itself may change; it becomes a competing risk model and the interaction between competing channels must be taken into account. 1 4 The complete list of estimated parameters (and corresponding standard errors) is available from the authors on request. 1 5 Speci® c experience appears to be signi® cant at the 6% level when choosing between advertisements and informal contacts.
at hand (construction, industrial, services and quaternary sector, respectively) and the size of the ® rm (small, medium and large, respectively). Furthermore, the presence of a personnel department is taken into consideration. Appendix A contains a summary of the data.
V. E MP I R I C A L R E S U L T S
In this section, we present the maximum likelihood estimates of the recursive model of the choice of ® rst recruitment channel and the corresponding recruitment duration (as presented in Section III). Consequently, we consider in our duration model the speed (i.e., time to ® ll a job) of the ® rst chosen search channel only. As mentioned in the previous section, we use a sample of ® lled vacancies to estimate the model. We assume here that the labour market is in a steady state during these six months, and hence the stock of vacancies is assumed to be constant in this period (November 1985Ð April 1986 .
1 1 In a steady state, the observed sample of the most recently ® lled vacancies is a random sample of all vacancies which were ® lled during the past six-month period.
1 2 Since in a steady state in¯ow and out¯ow are assumed to be equal (both in size and composition), one may also consider the observed sample of ® lled vacancies as a random sample of jobs¯owing into the vacant stock.
Our model of employers' search involves di erent hazard functions for each choice of ® rst search channel. Now, let the length of a vacancy duration spell in our sample be denoted by T . Then, we have a completed spell of length T for the hazard model related to channel c, if the ® rst search channel remains the only channel opened during the recruitment process (and Ð of course Ð becomes the hiring channel). Alternatively, we observe a right-censored (or incompleted) spell of length T rc when the employer activates a second channel after a period of length T rc .
1 3 In this case, the contribution of the duration part (related to channel c) to the likelihood function becomes equal to S (
However, for some cases in our data the moment at which the additional channel is activated ( T rc ) is unknown; we do not observe the exact T rc when the ® rst channel activated becomes the hiring channel. So, we only know that this moment should be at some point in time between 0 and T . The contribution to the likelihood function of these cases then becomes the following:
Finally, we take a piece-wise constant representation for the baseline hazard t c (t) , so that
and assume a type I extreme value distribution for the error term (e c ) in the choice model. First, we discuss the outcomes of the multinominal logit model for the`choice of ® rst channel'. The main ® ndings of this model are summarized in Table 2 (in Appendix B we show the multinominal logit estimates relative to the category`others'; from these coe cients one can also obtain the results for choosing between other pairs of search channels presented in Table 2 ; for example, the choice between advertisements and informal contacts).
1 4 We observe that employers prefer to start searching by placing an advertisement instead of using informal contacts if (i) speci® c work experience is required; 1 5 (ii) the applicant should belong to a certain age group; (iii) an administrative job has to be ® lled; (iv) it concerns a permanent or full-time job; and (v) the ® rm is of medium size. Using advertisements is expected to be more costly than informal methods due to higher direct recruitment costs of placing an advertisement in a newspaper, higher costs of`foregone' productivity (because it probably takes more time to ® ll a vacancy) and higher screening costs (because the ® rm has less reliable information about the applicants). Despite these costs, employers decide to use advertisements in the case of (permanent, full-time) jobs requiring speci® c work experience and a speci® c age, since they expect that the`best' candidate Ð selected via a pool of applicants Ð will have such a level of productivity that this more than o sets the expected costs of recruitment. The same argument may apply to administrative jobs and vacancies originating in ® rms of medium size. Table 3 the e ects of the variables on the hazard rate are presented; the e ects on recruitment duration have the opposite sign.
Advertisements are also preferred by employers tò others' in the case of administrative /sales jobs, vacancies in the quaternary sector and requirements associated with age and work experience.
Another ® nding is that the labour exchange o ce is chosen instead of advertisements when (i) no experience is required; (ii) the position is temporary; and (iii) the vacant job occurs in a small ® rm or the industrial sector. In the latter case, employers also prefer the labour exchange o ce to the use of informal contacts. Hence, it seems that the labour exchange o ce is primarily activated as the ® rst search channel when jobs in the`secondary segment of the market' have to be ® lled.
The minimum level of education required appears to play no signi® cant role in the decision to activate the ® rst recruitment channel. A perhaps unexpected result is found for the presence of a personnel department. It is found that ® rms having a personnel department make signi® cantly more use of informal search methods than advertisements. This e ect might stem from a higher ability to recruit for applicants inside the ® rm.
Next, we turn to the estimation results of the hazard models for ® lling a vacancy via the ® rst chosen search channel (see Table 3 ).
1 6 Clearly, the e ects of the exogenous variables vary considerably over the recruitment channels. More speci® cally, we can draw the following conclusions. First of all, it takes signi® cantly more time to ® ll jobs requiring high educational levels via advertisements than ® lling jobs requiring a low educational level. This implies that either there exists a shortage of workers with speci® c educational quali® cations or relatively long selection and screening procedures are carried out when hiring a highly educated person. Requiring higher skill levels (namely, educational level and speci® c educational demands) leads to signi® cantly longer durations when using informal contacts. This positive e ect on the duration of ® lling a job suggests that it is more di cult to ® nd a highly skilled employee, because Ð in the case of using informal contacts Ð screening procedures are expected to be relatively short. Large ® rms tend to use more time than small ® rms when a job is ® lled via an informal contact. Small ® rms probably have morē exible procedures than large ® rms during the hiring process. Moreover, vacant jobs classi® ed into the`medical, educational and social' occupational group are remarkably rapidly ® lled when using advertisements or informal contacts, while jobs in the quaternary sector are very di cult to Mean log-likelihood
Notes: Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given as follows: required education (primary), occupational group (others), size of the ® rm (small), sector of the ® rm (industrial), personnel department (no personnel department), required experience (no experience), age restrictions (no restrictions), permanent job (temporary), full time job (part time), new job created (replacement). Standard errors in parentheses. * Signi® cant at the 5% level.
® ll via the labour exchange o ce. Finally, temporary jobs are more quickly ® lled than permanent jobs via the labour exchange o ce. Thus, apparently it is very di cult for the labour exchange o ce to match their registered (mainly unemployed) job seekers with permanent jobs. It is plausible that the permanent nature of the job is a signal of the importance of the job for the ® rm. Moreover, it is more di cult for ® rms to adjust possible mistakes made in actual recruitment for permanent jobs. In the light of these two observations, several explanations may be given for the di culty in ® lling permanent jobs via the labour exchange o ce. For example, it takes the labour exchange o ce a great deal of time (e.g. due to pre-screening activities on motivation, ability, work-experience, etc.) to send applicants to the ® rm with a vacant permanent position. Another reason could be that employers apply lengthy screening procedures for applicants sent by the labour exchange o ce to ® ll a permanent position (probably due to the negative stigma attached to applicants showing up via the labour exchange o ce). Now we present the patterns of the hazard rates over time (based on estimates of the piece-wise constant function t with weekly steps for the ® rst two months) for the recruitment channels advertisement and informal contacts (see Figs 2 and 3) . As can be seen from the graphs, we ® nd remarkably di erent patterns for the hazard rate over time. If employers decide to use advertisements ® rst, we see that the hazard rate is positive duration dependent with a peak of exit at six weeks. 1 7 This suggests that employers search non-sequentially, that is, they acquire a pool of applicants and select the next candidates from this pool after having screened the ® rst to arrive. Hence, this result is a further con® rmation of the conclusion drawn by van Ours and Ridder (1992) that when employers advertise they form a pool of applicants.
Our results, however, reveal also that if employers start searching by using informal contacts, the hazard rate appears to be negative duration dependent. This means that either the recruitment channel works quickly (as is shown by the relatively high level of the hazard rate during the ® rst four weeks) or it does not work at all. In the latter case, employers decide to switch to other channels (for example, placing an advertisement) and hence, the vacancy will not be ® lled via the ® rst chosen recruitment channel.
As regards the pattern for the labour exchange o ce and others', we ® nd neither positive nor negative duration dependence of the hazard rate.
We conclude our analysis by testing whether there is unobserved heterogeneity present in the duration model for each recruitment channel c. For this purpose, the duration models are re-estimated with a two-points heterogeneity component v = (v 1 , v 2 ) included in the constant term of the hazard rate (while Pr(v 1 ) = a and hence, Pr(v 2 ) = 1 -a ).
The parameters of the duration model (b , t , a , v 1 , v 2 ) are estimated by maximum likelihood methods for each choice of the ® rst search channel c. The results show that Ð for each submodel related to search channel c Ð the added heterogeneity components (v 1 , v 2 ) converge to the same value, while the probability parameter a becomes 1/2. The parameters of the exogenous variables (z) and the time-varying dummies (t c (t)) remained the same as before.
1 8 Apparently, the statistical variation of the hazard over time (as shown in Figs 2 and 3 for advertisements and informal contacts respectively) was already captured by the time-varying dummies. We conclude that neglected heterogeneity does not in¯uence the outcomes of the reduced form duration models corresponding to each recruitment strategy and hence, it seems to be justi® ed to estimate the duration and`choice of ® rst channel' models separately.
V I . C O N CL U S I O N S
In this paper, we used micro data on vacancy duration and search channels to analyse the recruitment strategy of employers. To this end, a model for the choice of recruitment strategy and the hazard of ® lling a vacancy via the chosen search strategy is developed. In the absence of unobserved heterogeneity in the`reduced form' duration models for each search channel, this model can be estimated separately. The e ects on the choice of the ® rst recruitment channel are interpreted within the context of an employer's search model in which the employer chooses ® rst the channel with the highest value for expected bene® ts minus expected costs. The underlying structure of the hazard rate of ® lling a vacancy via a speci® c recruitment channel is formulated in terms of the well known product of arrival rate (of selected applicants) and probability that an applicant is acceptable.
The model is estimated for the Dutch labour market by taking the ® rst chosen recruitment channel and corresponding recruitment duration as dependent variables. The results of the choice model show that advertisements are chosen as the ® rst channel when work experience is required. It also appears that the labour exchange o ce is activated by employers as the ® rst search channel in the case of vacancies originating in the`secondary segment' of the labour market. Estimates for the hazard models suggest that if an advertisement is used, employers search in a non-sequential way. Moreover, advertising takes more time in the case of vacancies requiring high educational levels. This result is nicely in line with previous studies for the Dutch labour market (see van Ours and Ridder, 1992) . A di erent picture emerges, however, when employers decide to start searching via informal contacts. The time-varying pattern of the hazard associated with this search method shows either rapid success (i.e., hiring an applicant via this channel) or hardly any success at all. Hence, screening and selection periods cannot take much time when informal contacts are ® rst activated.
In summary, focusing on the choice of search methods and vacancy duration provided useful information about employers' recruitment procedures. Future structural analysis of the full recruitment strategy (sequencing and timing of search channels, length of screening and selection processes, direct recruitment costs of using a particular channel, and optimal size of the pool of applicants) may lead to an even more comprehensive analysis of the manner in which vacancies are ® lled. Notes: Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given in brackets: required education (primary), occupational group (others), size of the ® rm (small), sector of the ® rm (industrial), personnel department (no personnel department), required experience (no experience), age restrictions (no restrictions), permanent job (temporary), full time job (part time), new job created (replacement). Standard errors in parentheses. * Signi® cant at 5%.
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